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Executive Summary
As we approach the 40th anniversary of the landmark Humphrey-Hawkins Act, this report 
underscores how the Federal Reserve’s full employment mandate has made the Fed more 
accountable to working people. The report first traces the historical origins of the full employment 
mandate and highlights the pivotal but little-known role racial justice activists played in its creation. 
From the 1930’s and through the rise of the civil rights movement, racial justice activists including 
Coretta Scott King, called for a coordinated federal effort to attain full employment. They envisioned 
an economy where every person who seeks employment can secure a job. King joined Congressional 
leaders Augustus Hawkins and Hubert Humphrey in eventually passing the landmark 1978 Full 
Employment and Balanced Growth Act (Humphrey-Hawkins) which legally required the Fed to  
pursue maximum employment. The report then turns to Federal Reserve monetary policy in the 
1990’s which offers an instructive model of what a full employment economy can look like.  
This real-world case study from our recent history shows that when labor markets tighten,  
workers begin to see broad-based wage gains, and persistent economic inequalities are reduced. 
Finally, the report underscores the continued importance of the full employment mandate today  
while providing an overview of proposed policies to eliminate or significantly curtail its effectiveness.  
In light of these findings, this report calls on Federal Reserve policymakers to use all tools at their 
disposal to fully realize the Fed’s full employment mandate. Members of Congress must publicly 
affirm the importance of full employment while committing to reject any efforts to weaken or 
eliminate the full employment mandate. In particular, the Senate must reject nominees to the  
Board of Governors who have called for the narrowing of the Fed’s mandate or who support  
policies that would undermine the Fed’s ability to pursue full employment.
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Key Findings
Section I traces the historical origins of the full employment mandate, detailing the racial justice 
impetus behind the call for a full employment economy:
■■  During the 1930’s, and through the rise of the civil rights movement of the 1950’s and 60’s, 
racial justice activists called for a coordinated federal effort to attain full employment. This 
was borne out of the recognition that economic recessions cause deep inequities and magnify 
already-existing labor market disparities. African American workers recognized structural 
reasons lurked behind the fact that they were twice as likely to be out of work.  
■■  Civil rights leader Coretta Scott King played a pivotal, but not widely recognized, role in 
advocating for full employment. As a founder of the National Committee for Full Employment/
Full Employment Action Council, King joined Congressional leaders Augustus Hawkins and 
Hubert Humphrey in calling for and eventually passing the landmark 1978 Full Employment and 
Balanced Growth Act (Humphrey-Hawkins Act).
Section II looks to the Fed’s policies in the 1990’s, which offers an instructive model for what a full 
employment economy looks like and illustrates the importance of the mandate:
■■  If the Fed did not have a full employment mandate during this period, and was singularly 
focused on ensuring price stability, it would have likely raised interest rates in response to an 
unwarranted concern about inflation.
■■  Despite the conventional wisdom at the time that unemployment below 6.0 percent would 
spark inflation, the Fed resisted calls to raise interest rates and explored the bounds of its full 
employment mandate.
■■  These low unemployment rates of the 1990’s had many positive dividends, including higher 
wages, higher output, and lower rates of inequality in the economy. This real-world case study 
shows that when labor markets tighten, workers begin to see broad-based wage gains and 
persistent economic inequalities are reduced.
Section III underscores the continued importance of the full employment mandate today while 
providing an overview of proposed policies to eliminate or significantly curtail the effectiveness of the 
Fed’s dual mandate:
■■  In recent years, the full employment mandate has increasingly been under attack. Some 
Members of Congress and prominent members of the Trump administration have advocated 
for the outright elimination of the full employment mandate and have introduced legislation to 
that effect.
■■  Congress is also considering legislation that would constrain the Fed’s ability to achieve its 
full employment mandate. In particular, House Republicans have unified behind legislation 
requiring the Fed to adopt strict, rules-based monetary policy, specifically the so-called 
“Taylor Rule.” 
Its Origins and Importance
3
■■  If the Fed had been required to follow a Taylor Rule in the wake of the Great Recession, it 
would have led to constrained growth and smaller job gains for working Americans.
■■  Based on the Federal Open Market Committee voting records, the 12 Federal Reserve Bank 
presidents have traditionally been more conservative and prioritized raising interest rates over 
ensuring full employment. Any proposed policies that expand the Reserve Bank presidents’ 
power would likely diminish the full employment goal.
 Recommendations
In light of these findings, this report calls on:
■■  Federal Reserve policymakers to use all tools at their disposal to fully realize the Fed’s full 
employment mandate.
■■  Members of Congress to publicly affirm the importance of full employment and commit to 
reject any efforts to weaken or eliminate the full employment mandate.
■■  Members of Congress to only consider nominees who are committed to the full employment 
mandate as the Trump administration begins nominating Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
appointees. Moreover, Members of Congress should seek public commitments to uphold  
the full employment mandate from prospective Board of Governor candidates during 
confirmation hearings. 
■■  The Senate to reject nominees to the Board of Governors who have called for the narrowing  
of the Fed’s mandate or who support policies that would undermine the Fed’s ability to pursue 
full employment.
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Fed Up activists in Jackson Hole, Wyoming calling for Full Employment during the Fed’s Annual conference, August 25, 2015.
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Introduction 
Since its creation in 1913, the Federal Reserve and its monetary policies have had a substantial impact 
on overall economic conditions and the labor market. With the passage of the 1978 Full Employment 
and Balanced Growth Act (also referred to as the Humphrey-Hawkins Act), the Federal Reserve was 
specifically required to “promote full employment and production, increased real income, balanced 
growth...adequate productivity growth, proper attention to national priorities, achievement of an 
improved trade balance [...] and reasonable price stability.”1 Humphrey-Hawkins clarified the role  
that monetary policy can play in improving the employment picture and required the Fed to weigh  
the impact that its interest rate policy would have on the job market. The law also created a 
mechanism for the Fed to communicate and collaborate with elected lawmakers, and explicitly 
established the Fed as a federal government institution with a mission to serve the public interest by 
promoting full employment. 2
As we approach the 40th anniversary of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act, this report underscores how 
the Fed’s full employment mandate has achieved its purpose of making the Fed more accountable 
to the interests of working people. The full employment mandate, when taken seriously by Federal 
Reserve officials and the Congressional representatives they report to, strengthens the labor market 
and ensures that more people secure gainful employment. This report looks back to offer important 
historical insights into the formation of the full employment mandate as well as case studies on 
instances when Fed policy decisively supported and benefitted from the full employment mandate. 
These surface important insights to inform the Fed’s approach to the full employment mandate in the 
coming years. In particular, the report highlights 1) the important but largely forgotten contributions 
of the civil rights movement in two landmark pieces of legislation establishing full employment as a 
government imperative (Employment Act of 1946 and the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978), and the 
ways in which full employment remains a vital objective for communities of color 2) offers a case study 
from the 1990’s when policymakers at the Fed prioritized their full employment mandate, yielding new 
insights into what a full employment economy truly looks like, and 3) examines the full employment 
mandate in our current economic and political climate, cautioning against proposed ideas that would 
threaten full employment and offering proposed reforms the Fed should adopt to fully realize the vision 
laid out in the Humphrey-Hawkins Act.
Section I: The Civil Rights Movement and the Push 
for Full Employment 
One of the most important goals of the civil rights movement was the quest for full employment. Since 
the 1930’s and 40’s, and through the rise of the modern civil rights movement that would see some 
of its most significant victories in the 1950’s and 60’s, civil rights activists have pointed out the deep 
disparities that result from economic recessions and how these magnified already-existing labor market 
inequities. Civil rights activists called for a coordinated federal effort to attain full employment as the 
means of achieving a more fair and just economy. These efforts helped create changes to federal 
law via the Employment Act of 1946 and Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978. The thrust of both laws 
was greater participation in monetary and fiscal policy decisions by the American people, and greater 
collaboration by economic institutions, including the Federal Reserve, to represent the public interest 
by achieving full employment.
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The Employment Act of 1946 
The call for full employment —an economy where every person who seeks employment can 
secure a job—arose as part of broader transnational stirrings in the wake of the Depression and 
the winding down of World War II. As many looked out towards the end of the war, it was unclear 
whether a return to a peacetime economy would also return all working people, especially women 
and communities of color, to the precarious economic conditions they experienced before. The 
war had also demonstrated that, with political will, the government had a host of options available 
in manufacturing goods and services. The impulse to maintain a rising standard of living for the 
majority of working people crystallized as President Roosevelt’s famed 1941 call for “freedom from 
want.” It found later expression in Roosevelt’s 1944 State of the Union Address when he called for 
an “Economic Bill of Rights,” which affirmed, “the right to a useful and remunerative job [and…] 
the right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and recreation.”3 It was similarly 
endorsed in the 1945 Charter of the United Nations, which stated, that “higher standards of living, 
full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development,” were necessary 
for peace and international stability.4 Black freedom movement organizers and working-class 
organizations like the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) put full employment as the key issue 
on their agenda. Willard Townsend, a leading Black trade unionist, explained many of the key issues in 
a July 1944 speech at Fisk University:
“ Will peace destroy the gains toward full employment of the Negro? What will be his 
status at the end of hostilities? A depressed economy has always meant but one 
thing for the Negro worker—widespread unemployment. If we have an economy of 
full employment, it will establish a framework favorable to the continuing occupational 
advancement of the black worker; and to the removal of white worker’s fear of him as 
economic rival.”5
African American workers experienced racist violence and “hate strikes” as they tried to advance in 
occupational status. Full employment intended to ensure that returning Black soldiers would not leave 
the threat of violence at the hands of the Axis Powers only to encounter violence at home.
Similarly, the CIO worried what the conclusion of the war would mean for all the women who had 
newly entered the waged workforce. They explained this in their 1944 Women’s Guide to Political 
Action: “If jobs become so scarce that women must give up employment, jobs will also be scarce for 
men. We will be on the road to another depression—and another war.”6 Full employment was one of 
the most necessary tools to mollify the impacts of racial and gender-based discrimination.
In the mid-1940’s, ideas about full employment enjoyed broad consensus. It was not just activists 
that argued for full employment. The Department of Agriculture issued pamphlets with titles like 
“What Peace Can Mean to American Farmers: Maintenance of Full Employment.” While the National 
Resources Planning Board produced the pamphlet “After the War—Full Employment.”7 Written by 
influential Harvard economist Alvin Hansen (who also served as a Special Economic Advisor to the 
Federal Reserve) the 1942 pamphlet received suggestions from members of the Federal Reserve. 
Similarly, Chairman of the New York Fed, Beardsley Ruml, was one of two key advisors for the 
Planning Board. The pamphlet declared on its opening page the importance of full employment: 
“A positive program of post-war economic expansion and full employment, boldly conceived and 
vigorously pursued, is imperative. Democracies, if they are going to lead the world out of chaos and 
insecurity, must first and foremost offer their people opportunity, employment, and a rising standard 
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of living.”8 The average American was convinced as well. When Fortune magazine ran a poll in 1944 
that asked “Do you think the Federal Government should provide jobs for everyone able and willing to 
work, but who cannot get a job in private employment?” 67.7 percent of respondents said yes.9 For 
many constituencies, from diverse social and economic positions, full employment was the key issue 
on the post-war agenda.
The wide-ranging social consensus led to the introduction of the Full Employment Bill of 1945, which 
soon ran up against the political and racial constraints of Jim Crow America. The 1945 bill emphasized 
that “all Americans able to work and seeking work have the right to useful, remunerative, regular and 
full-time employment. And it is the policy of the United States to assure the existence at all times of 
sufficient employment opportunities to enable all Americans […] to freely exercise this right.”10 The 
bill passed the Senate 71-10 before being met with stern opposition in the House, where it ultimately 
faltered as a result of Midwestern Republicans and Southern Democrats.
The power of these politicians such as Carter Manasco and 
William Whittington to derail the proposed Full Employment 
Bill of 1945 was premised on Jim Crow voting exclusions 
that had enhanced the power of the former Confederacy 
in Congress. Whittington, a Mississippi Congressman, 
exemplified how the anti-democratic accumulations of wealth 
and power could undermine full employment proposals. 
Whittington’s social power emanated from his membership 
in the Delta Council—the aristocratic political organization 
comprised of leading cotton growers and businesspeople of 
the region; and his political power rested on the foundation 
of white supremacy. A Jim Crow electorate put him in office 
without opposition, and with a mere 4,000 votes in a district with 435,000 people. Similarly, Manasco, 
Chair of the House Expenditures Committee, hailed from Alabama’s Seventh District. Elections in 
his district often brought out less than 10 percent of the population. He presided over the home of 
Coretta Scott King’s family in Perry County as well as many of the pivotal sites of the struggle for 
voting rights, including Selma and Birmingham. Seeking to maintain the racial and economic structure 
of his district, Manasco opposed the bill on the grounds that farm workers might leave in search of 
more gainful employment.11 The Full Employment Bill had potential to change the prevailing system 
of racial and labor relations premised on the subordination of African Americans. Consequently, the 
bill faced opposition from business and farm lobbies, who sought to replace the bill with one that was 
less threatening.12
As a result, there were significant differences between the 1945 Full Employment bill and the 
eventual 1946 Employment Act. Proposals that established an affirmative right to full-time 
employment and planning mechanisms to achieve it were removed.13 Nevertheless, in spite of the 
ways that the 1945 bill had its most transformative elements withdrawn, the consensus for full 
employment was strong enough to pass the 1946 Employment Act. The law sought to establish 
more coherent economic planning. Thus, it created Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) and 
Congress’s Joint Economic Committee (JEC) to support the federal government’s responsibility 
to ensure “maximum employment”—a compromise in order to avoid specific prescriptions for 
full employment.14 Notwithstanding some shortcomings, the Act was tremendously significant for 
reconceptualizing the responsibilities of the federal government. It has rightfully been called the 
The power of these 
politicians such as Carter 
Manasco and William 
Whittington to derail the 
proposed Full Employment 
Bill of 1945 was premised on 
Jim Crow voting exclusions 
that had enhanced the 
power of the former 
Confederacy in Congress.
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“Magna Carta of the American Economy.”15 As President Truman described in his signing statement: 
“ The Act declares that it is ‘the continuing policy and responsibility of the federal 
Government...to coordinate and utilize all its plans, functions, and resources for the 
purpose of creating and maintaining…conditions under which there will be afforded 
useful employment opportunities, including self-employment, for those able, willing, 
and seeking to work.”16 
The form that full employment would take was still to be determined, but the Act designated this as a 
crucial moral and political responsibility of government, and created the CEA and the JEC in order to 
affirm the federal government’s signal importance in economic policymaking.17
Full Employment & the Civil Rights Movement in the 1950’s and 60’s
The quest for full employment would evolve over the subsequent decades. In the years since the 
war, economic life had seen great changes but African American workers remained twice as likely 
to be unemployed. When this constant feature of the structural inequities in the labor market began 
to combine with increased automation and mechanization of a number of key industries in the late 
1950’s, and after the significant recession of 1957-58, civil rights activists renewed their commitment 
to full employment.
As A. Philip Randolph set out to organize the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom in early 
1963, the jobs component was at the forefront of his agenda—so much so that an initial name was 
the “Emancipation March for Jobs.” Although it is most remembered for Martin Luther King’s “I 
Have a Dream” speech, and its role in helping elicit the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act, its 
central demand—full employment—has gone both unfulfilled and, for many, unknown. This was not 
due to inadequate effort but the challenges of achieving legislation. At the march, a number of the 
250,000 in attendance held signs reading “Civil Rights + Full Employment = Freedom.” Many had, 
undoubtedly, read the organizing manual, which had emphasized the demands for “a massive Federal 
Public Works Program to provide jobs for all the unemployed, and Federal legislation to promote an 
expanding economy.”18 Unfortunately, these demands went unacknowledged by those who might be 
able to translate this vision into policy.
For both Congress and one of the March’s most important observers, President Kennedy, the jobs 
demands were overlooked.19 In a meeting with the March leaders shortly after the event to discuss 
recently introduced civil rights legislation, Randolph pressed Kennedy about automation and joblessness 
but Kennedy skirted the issue. Instead, he told the activists to focus on what “the Jewish community 
has done, on educating their children, on making them stay in school and all the rest.”20 However, the 
10.7 percent unemployment for “non-white” workers was double the rate for white workers. As the 
activists understood, no amount of commitment to education could solve this problem.21
Given persistent unemployment in the African American community, Randolph and his closest ally in 
the civil rights struggle, Bayard Rustin, continued to work towards achieving full employment. In the 
years after the March, they collaborated with President Truman’s former CEA Chair Leon Keyserling to 
craft the “Freedom Budget for All Americans.” The Freedom Budget sought to rectify what Randolph 
and Rustin saw as some of the deficiencies from the March on Washington—namely the need for 
the civil rights movement to help use its newly-won power in the voting booth to go beyond voting 
for individual legislators, but towards crafting legislation. In particular, the Freedom Budget called for 
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“more effective public control of the Federal Reserve System” and asked for greater coordination of 
fiscal and monetary policies. 22
As riots and rebellions broke out across the U.S. in the years after the March on Washington, many 
other civil rights activists focused attention on full employment as well. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
was one of many endorsers of the Freedom Budget. Dr. King spoke often about the urgency of the 
situation and inadequacy of the funding provided to the War on Poverty. In a pamphlet about the 
Freedom Budget, Dr. King stressed the necessity of it: 
“ We must dedicate ourselves to the legislative task to see that it is immediately and 
fully achieved…The Freedom Budget is essential if the Negro people are to make 
further social progress. It is essential if we are to maintain social peace…It is a moral 
commitment to the fundamental principles on which this nation was founded.”23 
But moral commitments alone did not win legislation, especially when politicians elected from Jim 
Crow districts remained in control of some of the most important Congressional committees.
Less than a year and half after penning those words, Dr. King was dead, but the vision of full 
employment remained alive. In the days after his assassination, Coretta Scott King wanted to ensure 
that his work continued. Four days after his assassination, she spoke on the steps of the Memphis 
City Hall. She told the crowd of supporters and mourners that “we must carry on because this is 
the way he would have wanted it.” And she made sure to clarify what the goals were: “every man 
deserves a right to a job or an income so that he can pursue liberty, life, and happiness. Our great 
nation, as he often said, has the resources, but his question was: Do we have the will?”24 Over the 
subsequent years Scott King would shape her own movement to generate such a political will.
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Coretta Scott King and the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978
Glancing at the political landscape in 1974, Scott King could see the growing urgency of the economic 
situation. The stagflation crisis had been devastating for the most marginalized workers and their 
families. Accordingly, Scott King began work to create the National Committee for Full Employment/
Full Employment Action Council (NCFE/FEAC) in order to continue the struggle for full employment.
Around this same time, legislators like Augustus Hawkins and Hubert Humphrey were working 
towards similar ends in their own spheres of influence. In October 1973, Hawkins helped organize a 
conference between researchers and policymakers on the topic at UCLA. In his introductory remarks, 
Hawkins traced some of the legacies of the 1946 Employment Act and a path forward: 
“ Thirty years ago, as the war-time election of 1944 came close, both the Democratic 
and Republican candidates pledged themselves to ‘jobs for all’ in the postwar 
period…Under the Employment Act, America took two important steps in the right 
direction. First, it expressed the country’s determination never again to tolerate a mass 
depression. Second, it set up the first beginnings of democratic machinery for national 
policy making and planning.” 
However, Hawkins noted that significant unemployment remained, especially for African Americans: 
“Much more work remains to be done,” he explained, “the brutal fact remains that the full 
employment levels achieved during World War II have never again been attained.”25
One of the key impediments at the time to greater coordination of economic policy was a Federal 
Reserve that was inattentive to both the policy implications of the Employment Act, and even the 
Joint Economic Committee itself. At the UCLA symposium, Loughlin McHugh a Senior Economist for 
the JEC, explained that they had trouble even getting data from the Fed. “We on the Joint Economic 
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Committee Staff—and the members of the committee—have been trying for years to get [Fed Chair] 
Arthur Burns and his predecessors to tell us why it is that they changed the money supply by so 
much over such and such a period. Burns finally agreed to send us a quarterly report, and it’s nothing 
more than a draft of an article that’s going to appear in a forthcoming Federal Reserve Bulletin.” And 
further, McHugh noted the importance of the Fed’s accountability to Congress and the American 
people. “The Federal Reserve is not an independent agency. It is a creature of Congress. I think 
in some way or another we ought to get this point across to the members of Congress and to the 
American people.”26
Over the coming years, as interest rates and unemployment rates ascended, NCFE/FEAC continued 
to build their movement, while Hawkins and Humphrey drafted and introduced legislation to 
ameliorate the crisis of unemployment. Hawkins drew explicitly on the stifled efforts of prior years. 
As he explained, “we must not replay the drama of events which led to the watering down and 
lessening of the full employment commitment contained in the Employment Act of 1946. The three 
decades that have since passed, combined with the current situation, thrust before us the urgent 
need for a commitment to the goals of genuine full employment and the guaranteed right to a job for 
each individual who wants to work.” Hawkins was concerned about how “full employment” itself 
had become a mystified concept. He described how important it was to clarify this in the legislation, 
stating “full employment is redefined as ‘a situation under which there are useful and rewarding 
employment opportunities for all adult Americans willing and able to work,’ in contrast to the current 
practice of setting a tolerable level of official unemployment for a narrowly defined labor force.”27 This 
sentiment echoed that of NCFE/FEAC, which sought to refute the “sophisticated ‘numbers game’ 
whereby ‘full employment’ is defined as an ever-increasing percentage of unemployment.”28
As unemployment spiked to a post-Great Depression high of nine percent in May 1975, the 
urgent need for full employment legislation revealed itself with ever greater force. Representative 
Hawkins—a founding member of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC—teamed with Senator 
Humphrey to author legislation requiring national economic planning to achieve full employment. 
The early versions of the proposed bill for what would become the Humphrey-Hawkins Act created 
a Job Guarantee Office and established the government as the “employer of last resort” to ensure 
that all who wanted a job had one, at prevailing wages and where they were located. Labor and civil 
rights groups like NCFE/FEAC coalesced to push candidates in the 1976 elections to announce their 
support for the bill, including Democratic presidential candidate Jimmy Carter. (By the time Carter 
came out in support, the bill had became so strongly associated with civil rights figures that President 
Gerald Ford accused Carter of pandering to minorities.) When Carter took office in 1977, the national 
unemployment rate remained high, with the Black unemployment rate at 14.5 percent. Humphrey-
Hawkins remained a leading legislative priority for King, CBC members, and labor leaders. President 
Carter, however, was hearing demands from economic advisers and business interests that the bill 
should be counterbalanced with language addressing their concerns about inflation.29
Senator Humphrey, who chaired the Joint Economic Committee (JEC), traveled with the JEC, 
holding hearings on how the economic crisis was impacting people throughout the country. At the 
time—and still today—unemployment was considered the necessary antidote to inflation, however, 
many of those suffering most from both refuted this analysis. The civil rights and labor organizer 
Addie Wyatt inveighed against these ideas at the Chicago hearings. She explained to Humphrey and 
the committee, “As much as we dislike inflation, we can see no cure for its evils in heavy doses of 
unemployment. Such medicine is not only ineffective, it is in itself worse than the disease it fails 
to cure.”30 By contrast, Robert Mayo, President of the Chicago Federal Reserve, also spoke at the 
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hearings. He held to the opposing view, which dominated at the Fed, that inflation should take greater 
priority than unemployment. As he explained, “inflationary attitudes have taken on an increasingly 
prominent role in our society… If we focus successively, gentlemen, on the correction of short run 
unemployment problems, serious as though they are, without thought of the consequences on 
purchasing power, we will have failed to consider fully the priorities which our resources should meet. 
We will have failed the true goals of the Employment Act.”31 This confrontation spoke to the key 
issues of inflation, unemployment, and public policy in the postwar U.S. The problem, for civil rights 
activists like Wyatt, was that although Mayo would bewail his displeasure with unemployment, it was 
not his community that was being treated as collateral damage in the war against inflation. As Scott 
King had put it during the Atlanta hearings, “the unemployed are not pawns to be sacrificed in some 
economic chess game.”32
The civil rights movement’s demands for greater democratic governance over their lives was 
extending into what the Fed considered its domain. But this came into conflict with members of the 
Fed like Mayo and Burns. At the time the New York Times described Burns’ attitude toward Congress 
as “a threat to the financial stability of the Republic,” and “inherently inflation-prone.”33 Burns’ 
resentment toward democratic governance in economic affairs resounded during an address one year 
after leaving the Fed. As he commented, the “persistence [of inflation] reflects the…the philosophic 
and political currents of thought that have impinged on economic life since the Great Depression and 
particularly since the mid-1960s.”34 This conflict over democratic governance of economic life is one 
element of what the Humphrey-Hawkins Act sought to settle.
After a tumultuous journey to become law, the 
Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 
1978 emphasized greater coordination between 
fiscal and monetary policy, toward the goal of full 
employment. In his signing statement, President 
Carter explained the law’s importance: “this 
Nation is putting its long-term economic goal of 
full employment with stable prices into law. This 
act requires that the Congress and the President 
and the Federal Reserve Board cooperate in 
probably an unprecedented way in indicating each 
year the policies that will be followed to achieve 
these goals,” he announced. The law now required 
the Fed to submit semiannual written reports 
about what they were doing to fulfill the goals 
of the new law, as well as providing Congress 
with semiannual testimony about their actions. 
Coretta Scott King similarly noted the law’s signal 
importance during the same press conference:
“ This is indeed a great historical occasion, perhaps as significant as the signing of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Perhaps in the future, 
history will record that it may be even more significant, Mr. President, because I think it 
deals with an issue on a basic human right that’s the most basic of all human rights, the 
right to a job. And that is a central priority now of our economic policy with the signing 
of this act into law today.”35
“ This is indeed a great historical 
occasion, perhaps as significant as 
the signing of the Civil Rights Act  
of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965. Perhaps in the future, 
history will record that it may 
be even more significant, Mr. 
President, because I think it deals 
with an issue on a basic human 
right that’s the most basic of all 
human rights, the right to a job. And 
that is a central priority now of our 
economic policy with the signing of 
this act into law today.”
—Coretta Scott King 
Upon the signing of the 
Humphrey-Hawkins 
Full Employment Act
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As Scott King illuminated, the law provided a compass to orient economic policymakers. However, 
this was not envisioned as the end of the journey. Indeed, the law also called for the unemployment 
rate to be reduced to no more than 3 percent for people over twenty-years-old within five years—
something that was not and has never been achieved since the law was signed.36 For Humphrey, 
Scott King and the many others who pursued full employment, the law was a first step, not the last. 
After all, the law’s proponents had granted numerous concessions during the legislative process, 
weakening the full employment mandate from a “commitment” to a “goal,” and scrapping the 
pledge that government would be the “employer of last resort.”37 President Carter acknowledged 
this incrementalism during the press conference, quoting Hubert Humphrey in saying, “A Humphrey-
Hawkins bill is a first step, but an indispensable one, toward an era of full employment, steady 
economic growth, and reasonable price stability. It is no panacea. It is no miracle cure, but with 
it, national economic policy will be required to be directed toward achieving specific, measurable 
economic goals.”
Nearly forty years after Humphrey-Hawkins was signed into law, a full employment economy that 
fulfills Coretta Scott King’s vision for racial and economic justice has yet to be achieved. Significant 
racial disparities in wages, unemployment, labor force participation, and other key measurements of 
economic conditions persist. Humphrey-Hawkins has demonstrated progress, however, by stipulating 
that monetary policy is a necessary part of the equation and by holding the Federal Reserve 
accountable to the ways that its policies impact unemployment. Section II will provide specific 
examples of how the Fed’s full employment mandate has proven useful toward facilitating economic 
growth and alleviating racial disparities since its enactment.
Section II: The Quest for Full Employment  
in the 1990’s
The Humphrey-Hawkins Act was passed toward the end of a decade in which Americans had 
experienced unusually high inflation. This meant the economic and central banking policymakers at 
the time were predisposed to be highly concerned about runaway inflation. In fact, the Humphrey-
Hawkins Act initially tasked the Federal Reserve with achieving zero percent inflation by 1988, even 
though economists and policymakers have since agreed that completely flat price growth is neither 
achievable nor desirable.38  For decades after the “Great Inflation” of the 1970’s, economists and 
Federal Reserve officials prioritized price stability, and even viewed full employment through the lens 
of what was possible to prevent inflation. 
While the Fed has never formally provided its definition of full employment, the main measure the 
Fed policymakers use as their goal for unemployment is known as the NAIRU—the Non-Accelerating 
Inflation Rate of Unemployment. Despite a high degree of uncertainty regarding the level of 
unemployment that can be achieved without sparking inflation, Fed officials historically prioritized 
their price stability objective by raising interest rates when the actual unemployment rate approached 
their estimate of the NAIRU. In the 1990’s, however, Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan led the 
Fed in bucking this conventional wisdom, and kept interest rates low even as the unemployment 
rate drifted below the NAIRU estimates. This decision allowed the Fed to truly test the bounds of full 
employment for the first time, resulting in a robust economy with tight labor markets and reduced 
labor market discrimination. 
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This history of the Fed’s conduct in the 1990’s illustrates the importance of the Fed’s full employment 
mandate and provides a window into what economic conditions are possible if the Fed properly 
balances and respects its full employment objective. Our present economic conditions can be viewed 
as being in a somewhat similar situation to the 1990’s, and the Fed’s policy decisions at the time offer 
important insights to apply today. At the time, the Fed pursued a path that not only ensured price 
stability but secured larger job gains and a sustained and equitable growth for more American people.  
Were it not for the full employment mandate, would not have taken this path, resulting in fewer jobs 
and worsened general welfare.
The 1990’s: A Decade of Growth and Stability 
The economy’s performance in the 1990’s was better than in any decade since the 1960’s. The GDP 
growth rate averaged over 3.4 percent in the decade, compared to a growth rate of 3.3 percent in the 
1980’s, 3.2 percent in the 1970’s, 1.6 percent in the 2000’s and 2.0 percent in the period from 2010 to 
2017. While the unemployment rate peaked at 7.8 percent following the 1990-91 recession, it then fell 
throughout the rest of the decade, reaching 4.0 percent as a year-round average in 2000.
Importantly, the gains were broadly shared. The last four years of the decade was the only time  
since the early 1970’s when workers up and down the wage distribution saw sustained wage gains. 
Real wages for workers at the 50th percentile rose by an average annual rate of 1.5 percent from 
1996 to 2001. Wages for workers at the 20th percentile rose slightly faster, with an average annual 
rate of 2.3 percent.
These impressive economic outcomes were far from inevitable. Through the first half of the decade, 
it was a widely accepted view within the economics profession that unemployment rates below 6.0 
percent would result in rapidly rising wages which would be passed via higher prices and vice-versa. 
The consensus estimate of the NAIRU was therefore 6.0 percent and an unemployment rate below 
that was deemed likely to trigger an inflationary spiral. According to this view, it would be necessary 
for the Fed to step in with higher interest rates to choke off job growth, if the unemployment rate 
started to fall much below the 6.0 percent safe range. Fortunately, as outlined below, the Fed did 
not go this route. The next section briefly recaps the history of this decade, first noting the basis and 
depth of the consensus on the 6.0 percent NAIRU, then detailing the Fed’s decisions on interest 
rates, as the unemployment rate hit and then fell below the accepted estimates of the NAIRU.
The Course of Unemployment and Fed Policy In the 1990’s Boom
The 1990-91 recession was not especially severe, but the recovery was unusually slow. The Fed felt 
confident that labor market conditions in the late 1980’s might induce inflation, and began raising 
interest rates in the last years of the decade, eventually pushing the federal funds rate to almost 
10.0 percent in 1989. Once it became clear that the economy was slowing, the Fed responded by 
lowering interest rates but it did so very gradually. This meant that the recovery did not get much of 
a boost from monetary policy. At the same time, with Congress concerned about budget deficits, a 
budget agreement was put in place in the middle of the recession in 1990 to actually cut spending 
and increase taxes. This meant that fiscal policy was acting pro-cyclically, being more contractionary 
in a recession.
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As a result of this contractionary fiscal policy and insufficiently stimulative monetary policy, 
unemployment continued to rise long after the recession officially ended in March of 1991. It 
eventually peaked at 7.8 percent in June of 1992 and then began to slowly decline, falling to 6.5 
percent at the end of 1993. At the time, this was approaching the level of the accepted estimates 
of the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment.39 While different methodologies gave 
somewhat different estimates of the rate of unemployment the economy could handle before 
triggering an inflation spiral, most fell in the range of 5.6 percent to 6.4 percent. The Congressional 
Budget Office’s estimate at the time put the NAIRU between 5.8 and 6.0 percent.40 It’s important to 
note that while these are informed estimates, there is always a degree of uncertainty on how these 
estimates will bear out in the actual economy.
In response to the economy approaching the generally accepted levels of full employment, the Fed 
started raising interest rates in February of 1994. From February of 1994 to March of 1995, the 
federal funds rate went from 3.0 percent to 6.0 percent.  This had the predictable effect of slowing 
the economy with growth declining from a 4.8 percent annual rate in the first half of 1994 to just 1.4 
percent in the spring and summer of 1995 as shown in Table 1. Despite the slowed pace of growth, 
the unemployment rate continued to decline, falling as low as 5.4 percent in February of 1995 before 
drifting modestly higher in the spring and summer.
UN Rate
Avg  job 
Growth 
6 mos
CPI YOY Core CPI YOY
Core PCE 
YOY
GDP 
Growth 
prior 2Qs
Fed Funds 
Rate
Jan ‘95 5.6 320,000 2.7 2.6 2.2 4 5.5
July ‘95 5.7 134,000 3 3 2.2 1.4 5.75
Jan ‘96 5.6 172,000 2.5 3 2.1 3.2 5.5
July '96 5.5 244,000 2.8 2.7 1.8 5 5.5
Jan '97 5.3 229,000 3.3 2.6 2.2 4 5.25
July '97 4.9 240,000 2.3 2.4 1.9 4.7 5.5
Jan '98 4.6 289,000 1.7 2.2 1.5 4.2 5.5
July '98 4.5 209,000 1.7 2.2 1.1 4 5.5
Jan '99 4.3 254,000 1.6 2.4 1.2 6 4.75
July '99 4.3 228,000 2 2.1 2.2 3.3 5
Jan '00 4 281,000 2.7 1.9 1.4 6.1 5.5
July '00 4 178,000 3.7 2.4 1.7 4.5 6.5
Jan' 01 4.2 109,000 3.4 2.6 1.8 1.4 6
Source: BLS, BEA, and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Table 1
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In this context, the Fed made a remarkable decision based on the state of the economy and the 
prevailing estimates of its potential. The conventional view would have been that the Fed should keep 
rates steady, if not actually raise them, sapping demand and causing the unemployment rate to rise 
closer to the estimates of the NAIRU. It instead decided to lower the federal fund rates by a quarter 
of a percentage point. Though not a large decrease, the decision to move interest rates downward in 
this context was remarkable. With an unemployment rate of 5.4 percent, the unemployment rate was 
already below the widely accepted range of estimates of the NAIRU.  Even though the rate of growth 
of employment had slowed to 134,000 a month in the first half of 1995 (from 320,000 in the second 
half of 1994), this was still in keeping or slightly above most estimates of the potential rate of growth 
of the labor force. In effect, the Fed was indicating a desire to see the economy grow more rapidly.
It is also worth noting that the rate of inflation was not especially low at this time. The overall 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) had risen by 2.7 percent over the prior year, with the core having risen 
only slightly less at 2.6 percent. The core Personal Consumption Expenditure deflator (PCE) showed 
a 2.2 percent rate of inflation over the prior year. This was before the Fed had adopted a 2.0 percent 
inflation target, but there certainly was no generally held view that inflation was too low. In effect, 
Greenspan and the Fed made a decision to push for stronger growth and lower unemployment,  
even though the generally held view among economists at the time was that this would lead to  
higher inflation.
The decision to push for full employment and keep interest rates low 
was even more striking as the rate of job growth and GDP growth 
began to accelerate in the second half of 1995. The economy 
created jobs at a monthly rate of 172,000 in the second half of 1995 
and 244,000 in the first half of 1996, pushing the unemployment 
rate down to 5.5 percent. The rate of GDP growth picked up sharply, 
reaching 5.0 percent in the first half of 1996. 
This was far more rapid than the generally accepted measures of 
the economy’s growth potential. The Budget and Economic Outlook 
released by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in January of 
1996 put the economy’s potential growth rate for the rest of the 
decade at less than 2.2 percent annually.41 The CBO projections are worth noting in this context, not 
only because CBO is itself considered an authoritative voice in policy debates, but also because its 
estimates are near the center of the consensus by design. CBO analyzes the range of professional 
forecasts and tries to locate its own projections near the center unless it has especially good grounds 
for differing with the consensus. In this case, there were not many forecasts that were substantially 
more optimistic than the ones produced by CBO at the time.
This means that the Fed was effectively making a decision not to take steps to slow the economy 
even though the unemployment rate was already below the accepted estimates of the NAIRU. 
Furthermore, the unemployment rate seemed likely to go considerably lower with both GDP and  
job creation growing considerably more rapidly than conventional estimate of their sustainable  
growth rates. 
The decision by the Fed to keep interest rates low was quite controversial at time, even within the 
Fed. Lawrence Meyer, then a Fed governor, has recounted an episode in which he and current 
Chair Janet Yellen, then also a Fed governor, confronted Greenspan before a meeting in September 
There can be no 
question that the 
Fed would never 
have allowed the late 
1990’s boom and 
the consequential 
sharp reduction in the 
unemployment rate 
if it did not have a full 
employment mandate.
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of 1996.42 According to Meyer’s account, they complained that Greenspan had to start raising 
interest rates given the economy’s rapid growth. Greenspan insisted that there was no evidence of 
inflationary pressure and managed to persuade Meyer and Yellen to agree to put off any rate hikes for 
the time being. 
In the face of pressure both inside and outside the Fed, Greenspan held to the view that the Fed 
should focus on evidence of actual inflationary pressures, not the pressures that would be predicted 
from conventional models:
“ We obviously are viewing an economy that at the moment does not resemble most of 
our textbook models. The unemployment rate is low and has remained low for quite 
a while. Anecdotal evidence continues to indicate tight labor markets, but with little 
evidence of significant wage acceleration. We also have a strong economic expansion 
under way, with industrial commodity prices falling even excluding the plunge in copper 
prices. Broader measures of price inflation are, if anything, still declining.”43
Greenspan stayed with this view, even as the unemployment rate fell further later in the decade. 
After the economy grew by 4.0 percent in the second half of 1996 and the unemployment rate had 
declined to 5.2 percent, Greenspan said in March of 1997:
“ We still do not have concrete evidence to suggest that the inflation rate has stopped 
going down. In this situation, we can allow ourselves a fairly considerable amount of 
time to act. Therefore, I do not think that there is any particular urgency to move in a 
very aggressive way. I do think we have to move, but I don’t think that we have to be 
concerned about being behind the curve in any measurable way.”44
The view pushed by Greenspan, and with which the rest of the Fed was willing to go along, was that 
it should set aside the conventionally accepted models and base its decisions on interest rates on 
evidence of actual inflationary pressures in the economy. He argued that the measures showed the 
opposite, inflation was slowing rather than accelerating, therefore there was no reason for the Fed to 
attempt to raise interest rates to clamp down on growth.
The Fed held off on interest rate hikes even as the unemployment rate fell below 5.0 percent in 
the summer of 1997, below 4.5 percent in the spring of 1998, and eventually reached 4.0 percent 
in December of 1999. In fact, Greenspan and the Fed actually cut interest rates in the fall of 1998, 
although the immediate motive was to restore stability to international financial markets rather than 
evidence of weakness in the U.S. economy.45 The economy grew at a 6.0 percent annual rate in the 
second half of 1998. 
The Fed didn’t begin to raise interest rates to any substantial extent until the spring of 2000, at which 
point the collapse of the stock bubble was already slowing the economy. This collapse pushed the 
economy into recession the following year and removed any concerns that the economy might be 
growing too rapidly. However, the country gained an enormous dividend as a result of Greenspan 
and the Fed’s willingness to allow the economy to grow and unemployment to fall, even if it meant a 
somewhat greater risk of inflation. 
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The Real World Impacts of the Fed’s Policy Decisions 
There can be no question that the Fed would never have allowed the late 1990s boom and the 
consequential sharp reduction in the unemployment rate if it did not have a full employment mandate. 
The models in use at the time indicated that keeping rates low would trigger an unacceptable 
increase in the inflation rate. It was only because of the commitment to achieving full employment 
that the Fed took a wait-and-see approach and refrained from raising interest rates until there was 
actual evidence of inflationary pressures in the economy. The Fed made a conscious decision to 
ignore the standard views of the NAIRU and instead focus on the inflationary pressures it actually saw 
in the economy, and the resulting dividends were enormous.
At the most simple level, cumulative output was 6.3 percent higher over the five years 1996 to 
2000 than if GDP growth had been constrained to CBO’s 2.2 estimated potential growth rate. In the 
2000 alone, GDP was 10.7 percent higher than if GDP growth had been constrained to remain at the 
potential estimated by CBO. In the 2017 economy this would imply an additional $2 trillion in annual 
output or more than $6,000 a year for every person in the country.
More importantly, the gains from the additional growth went disproportionately to those at the middle 
and bottom of the income ladder. This was the only time since the early 1970s when workers at the 
middle and bottom of the wage distribution saw sustained gains in real wages.  From 1995 to 2000, 
the real wage for workers at the 50th percentile of the wage distribution rose by 7.7 percent. The real 
wage for workers at the 20th percentile rose by 11.9 percent.46 The median wage for Black men rose 
by 8.9 percent over these years, while the median wage for Black women rose by 11.2 percent. For 
Hispanic men the increase was 10.2 percent, and 6.5 percent for Hispanic men.47 (These numbers 
were likely depressed by the fact that this was a period of rapid immigration, with new immigrants 
generally earning lower pay than native born Hispanics or earlier immigrants.) 
In addition, the unemployment rate for African Americans fell to 7.6 percent as a year-round average in 
2000. While this is still far too high to be acceptable, this compares to an average rate of 11.5 percent 
in 1994, when the unemployment rate averaged 6.0 percent, the mid-term of the conventionally 
accepted estimates of NAIRU at the time. The unemployment rate for Hispanics averaged 5.7 
percent in 2000, compared to 9.9 percent in 1994. Clearly the dividends from this experiment went 
disproportionately to people of color.
The overall CPI did cross 3.0 percent in 2000, but this was the result of a jump in world oil prices. 
Tighter policy by the Fed would not have averted this increase. The core inflation rates remained well 
under control, with the core CPI rising 2.6 percent in the year from December of 1999 to December 
of 2000. This is somewhat higher than the low point of 1.9 percent during this period, but it is still 
down from the 2.7 percent rate from June of 1995 to June of 1996. There is a similar story with 
the core PCE, which ended the period with a rise of just 1.8 percent year-over-year. In short, for all 
practical purposes there was no rise in the inflation rate over this period, with the inflation rates the 
economy was experiencing at the point when the recession hit in 2001 being well within the range 
generally considered acceptable. During this period, the greatest gains of the tighter labor market 
went to workers of color.
It is worth noting that there was a large uptick in the rate of productivity growth in the 1990s, which 
could allow for more rapid wage growth without an acceleration in the rate of inflation. By contrast, 
productivity growth has been extraordinarily weak in the current recovery. While this is an important 
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difference, the pickup in productivity growth was not expected and not recognized as a real trend until 
several years after the fact. A small number of economists did anticipate the speedup based on their 
assessment of the spread of information technology and their discussions with business people.48 
In conclusion, the country clearly reaped enormous benefits 
from the Fed’s decision to delay raising interest rates and 
allow the unemployment rate to fall below accepted measures 
of the NAIRU in the second half of the 1990’s, with this list 
just scratching the surface. It is also worth noting that the 
country never did pay a price in the form of any notable uptick 
in the inflation rate as a result of this experiment. In sum, the 
experience of the 1990’s provides a model for what a full 
employment economy looks like. When labor markets tighten, 
workers begin to see broad-based wage gains, and persistent 
economic inequalities are finally reduced. By prioritizing full 
employment over this period, the Fed showed that consistent, 
strong economic growth was possible, and got about as close 
to achieving both sides of its dual mandate as it ever has.
Section III: Ensuring the Fed Prioritizes the Full 
Employment Mandate & Rejects Congressional 
Action to Weaken It
The experience of the 1990’s shows that a Federal Reserve that places value and emphasis on the 
full employment mandate, in turn, makes policy decisions that can result in a very robust economy. 
This lesson is worth recapping in the current context, both because the economy can be viewed as 
being in a somewhat similar situation and also because it provides insights on how Congress should 
view the Fed’s mandate. While the Fed currently has an explicit dual mandate to pursue both high 
employment and price stability, there are many central banks whose mandate only requires them 
to pursue price stability. Because the strong economy of the 1990s was partially a result of Federal 
Reserve policy, narrowing the Fed’s mandate to mirror other central banks risks discounting the 
possibility of achieving 1990’s-level growth again.
It is likely that a Fed only focused on price stability would have acted to head off the strong growth in the 
second half of the 1990’s, sharply raising interest rates in response to some economists’ concerns that 
growth would lead to accelerating inflation. This is what the models in use at the time predicted. In effect, 
Greenspan and the Fed decided to maintain low interest rates, at a risk of higher inflation, with the hope 
that it would allow the economy to achieve higher levels of employment. In the 1990’s, this bet paid off and 
offered enormous dividends for the country with virtually no measurable cost in the form of higher inflation.
In the current situation, the Fed is also looking at an economy that is not behaving according to 
predictions of most models. The Fed, the CBO, and other forecasters have been forced to repeatedly 
lower their estimates of the NAIRU, as the unemployment rate has continued to drop without any 
evidence of increasing price pressures. Unlike the 1990’s, we have yet to see any evidence of an 
uptick in the rate of productivity growth. But in the absence of evidence of rising inflation, there would 
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seem to be little harm in following the same course the Fed pursued in the late 1990’s of allowing 
further growth and tightening in the labor market until there is evidence that inflation is exceeding 
an acceptable rate. In general, the benefits of a full employment economy outweigh the drawbacks 
of inflation at the currently manageable levels. Accordingly, the Fed today should follow the example 
of their predecessors in the 1990’s, continuing to stimulate the economy by holding off interest rate 
increases until evidence of truly problematic inflation emerges. 
Threats to the Full Employment Mandate
Although the history of the 1990’s suggests the value of reaffirming the Fed’s commitment to full 
employment, the reform efforts currently being considered in Congress are mostly intended to 
go in the opposite direction. Numerous members of Congress have suggested eliminating the full 
employment portion of the Fed’s mandate entirely. Legislation to that effect has been introduced 
in the past three sessions of Congress, and has won support from such prominent figures as Vice 
President Mike Pence, Speaker Paul Ryan, OMB Director Mick Mulvaney, and House Ways and 
Means Chair Dave Camp.49 In 2008, Pence joined 50 other Republicans in co-sponsoring a bill by 
current House Financial Services Chair Jeb Hensarling that would have repealed the Humphrey-
Hawkins Act in its entirety.50 
The Financial CHOICE Act & the Taylor Rule
In the current session of Congress, Rep. Hensarling has been pushing the “Financial CHOICE Act,” 
which recently passed the House of Representatives with nearly unanimous Republican support. The 
Financial CHOICE Act would require the Fed to follow a “Taylor Rule” in setting monetary policy. The 
Taylor Rule, which uses estimates of potential GDP and inflation to produce an appropriate level for 
the federal funds rate, can be a useful guideline for central bankers to be aware of in setting policy. 
However, requiring the Fed to strictly follow the Taylor Rule rule without taking additional factors, data, 
and labor market conditions into account, would sharply curtail the Fed’s discretion and ability to pursue 
full employment. The Financial CHOICE Act would also increase the representation of the Federal 
Reserve Regional Bank presidents among the voting members of the Fed’s Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) from five to six. This change in composition to the FOMC would likely result in policy that 
de-prioritizes employment because regional Reserve Bank presidents, whose selection is largely 
determined by the corporate and financial sector, tend to favor higher interest rates. These policies are 
likely to prove counterproductive from the standpoint of raising growth and reducing unemployment. 
It is unclear what problem these policies are meant to address. Many critics of the Fed’s efforts 
to boost the economy following the recession, including House Speaker Paul Ryan and Stanford 
economist John Taylor (the originator of the Taylor Rule) repeatedly warned that the Fed’s Great 
Recession expansionary policies would lead to inflation and a plunge in the value of the dollar. This 
concern was expressed directly in an open letter in November of 2010, signed by Taylor and several 
other prominent conservative economists, to Ben Bernanke who was Federal Reserve chair at the 
time.51 Taylor and his fellow signatories have been proven wrong.
If these critics had proven to be right, and inflation accelerated sharply and the dollar fell, there 
would be a reasonable case for a fundamental reassessment of the Fed’s monetary policy. However, 
inflation has been consistently below the Fed’s 2.0 percent target in the six and a half years since 
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the letter was sent. Furthermore, the dollar is considerably higher by most measures than it was in 
November.52 Given this context, it is not clear in what way the proponents of the Financial CHOICE 
Act hope to improve the Fed’s performance.
The usual rationale for the Taylor Rule is to remove uncertainty about Fed policy and to provide 
financial markets with clear guidance on the future direction of monetary policy.53 However, strictly 
following a Taylor Rule can have bad economic consequences by denying the Fed the freedom 
to adjust to the specific economic circumstances it faces. An analysis conducted by the Fed’s 
Minneapolis district Bank earlier this year found that strict adherence to a Taylor Rule in the years 
since 2010 would have kept an additional 2.5 million people out of work.54 In other words, even 
if Congressional Republicans keep the Fed’s full employment mandate in place, their preferred 
monetary policy reform, the Taylor Rule, would demonstrably undermine the Fed’s ability to achieve 
its full employment goal and leave millions unnecessarily out of work.
It is difficult to believe that anyone would consider a policy that would deny 2.5 million people 
the opportunity to work an improvement over current policy. And it is important to keep in mind 
that the additional 2.5 million people who would be jobless in the Taylor Rule scenario would be 
disproportionately African American and Latino, as well as people with less education. These are the 
people who stand most to gain from a full employment policy are at the greatest risk when the Fed 
needlessly restrains economic growth and job creation. 
As a practical matter, since the main focus of the Fed since the Great Recession has been to provide 
stimulus (at least until the end of 2015, when it raised the federal funds rate for the first time since 
the crash), the relevant question would be whether long-term rates may have fallen further if the Fed 
had given better guidance. If true, this would mean that we got less benefit from Fed policies than 
was desired, since the long-term rates that matter most for consumption and investment did not fall 
as much as they could have. In other words, if the argument is that the Fed was less effective than it 
should have been because financial markets were not getting clear guidance, then it must be the case 
that long-term interest rates were higher than the Fed desired due to its poor communication of its 
policy. We can never know a counterfactual, but the 10-year Treasury rate has consistently been well 
below the level projected by the CBO over the last six years, as shown in Figure 1, below.
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While this is partly due to the fact that the economy has also been somewhat weaker than CBO 
projected, it would be difficult to make the case that if the Fed had somehow been more consistent 
with its policy, that the 10-year rate would have been even lower. 
In fact, it is entirely possible that need to deviate from a strict Taylor Rule would lead to more 
uncertainty in financial markets. If actors in markets could never be certain when the Fed would 
adhere to the rule and when it would decide to use its discretion, it could result in much greater 
confusion about the future course of monetary policy than exists at present. At the very least, it is 
difficult to see how a requirement for loose adherence to a Taylor Rule provides better guidance to 
financial markets.
Increasing the Power of the Reserve Bank Presidents
Another Fed provision in the Financial Choice Act calls for increasing the number of the regional 
Reserve Bank presidents who are voting members of the FOMC from five to six. This is an explicit 
effort to increase the power of these private officials, who, unlike the Fed’s Board of Governors, are 
chosen through a closed-door process by the corporate boards of each Reserve Bank. It is difficult to 
see the justification for a move in this direction.
As it stands, the Federal Reserve System and the FOMC is an anomaly among government 
regulatory agencies in giving representatives of the regulated industry a direct say in the policy it 
implements. While there are industry advisory boards to agencies like the Federal Communications 
Commission and the Food and Drug Administration, the industry groups don’t get to directly appoint 
commissioners to these agencies. By contrast, the Reserve Bank presidents are appointed through a 
process in which the banks within the district have an exceptional amount of input.55
The FOMC meetings include all 12 Reserve Bank presidents as participants, but only five now have 
a vote at any one time The president of the New York Fed is always a voting member of the FOMC 
while the other 11 bank presidents rotate as voting members. This means that the seven governors 
should, in principle, outnumber the five voting bank presidents. However, there are often vacancies in 
the governor positions. As of late April 2017, there were only four sitting governors, meaning that in 
addition to having the dominant voice in meetings, Reserve Bank presidents also have a majority of 
the votes. 
The CHOICE Act, by adding another vote for the Reserve Bank presidents, would further tilt the 
balance in their direction. An analysis of the dissents recorded by Reserve Bank presidents on 
FOMC votes indicates that this would push monetary policy in a more contractionary direction. An 
examination of the FOMC minutes since 1993, when reasons for dissents were first recorded, shows 
72 dissents by Reserve Bank presidents where a clear basis for the dissent is given. 
In 64 instances the dissent was in the direction of more contractionary policy, meaning that the 
dissenters either wanted a rate hike when the majority voted to keep rates constant or that they were 
opposed to a rate cut approved by the majority. These dissents almost always raised concerns about 
inflationary pressures.  In only eight instances did the dissenting presidents want more expansionary 
policy (e.g. a rate cut when the majority wanted to hold rates constant).56 It is worth mentioning that 
in only one case did the president of the New York Fed dissent from the majority.
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In short, it is clear that the Bank presidents on average have been far more concerned about the risk of 
inflation than the governors, and paid less attention to the full employment part of the Fed’s mandate. 
Adding an additional vote for bank presidents could be expected to further push the Fed in the direction 
of enforcing the price stability part of its mandate, possibly at a cost of higher unemployment. 
It is very difficult to see the justification for this move. As noted earlier, the Bank presidents are 
appointed through an archaic process that gives excessive influence to the banks within the district. 
In 2015, three straight presidential vacancies at the Reserve Banks were filled by individuals with 
strong ties to Goldman Sachs, and two of the individuals chosen were involved in their own selection. 
In April, Richmond Federal Reserve President Jeffrey Lacker resigned after admitting to leaking 
market-sensitive information to a hedge fund—an event that underscored the typical coziness 
between the private Reserve Banks and the financial sector they oversee. As a matter of principle, 
it is difficult to see why Republicans in Congress would like to see power further removed from 
office holders elected through the democratic process and turned over to private officials appointed 
by unaccountable boards deeply influenced by the direct participation of the banking and financial 
sector. Furthermore, given the clear record of bias of Bank presidents towards more contractionary 
policy, giving them more power would likely push the Fed towards keeping inflation lower than would 
otherwise be the case, and unemployment higher.
Increasing the bias toward low inflation might be desirable if the economy had been suffering from 
excessive inflation, but the inflation rate has been consistently low and often below the Fed’s 2.0 
percent target for more than two decades. As with the push for requiring the Fed to follow a Taylor 
Rule, it is not clear what problem this policy is intended to fix.
Trump nominees to the Board of Governors
President Trump will soon attempt to fill three vacancies to the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. 
Many of the prospective  nominees do not recognize the importance of the full employment mandate, 
and if confirmed, would likely undermine the Fed’s ability to achieve its full employment objective. 
For example, Randal Quarles has been reported as Trump’s probable selection for the position of 
Vice Chair for Supervision. Quarles is an enthusiastic supporter of the Taylor rule.57 Another reported 
nominee for the Board of Governors is Marvin Goodfriend, who also supports rules-based monetary 
policy and has endorsed the Financial CHOICE Act.58 Goodfriend has explicitly called for eliminating 
the full employment mandate. In a March 2017 interview, Goodfriend called the full employment 
mandate “incoherent,” and in 2012, he agreed with the suggestion that the American economy would 
be better if the Fed focused only on price stability, calling the Fed’s efforts even to get to 7 percent 
unemployment a “Herculean” task.59
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Conclusion
It is clear the Federal Reserve’s full employment mandate serves a critical purpose of making the 
Fed more accountable to the interests of working people. The racial justice implications of realizing a 
full employment economy were widely recognized and fought for during the civil rights movement. 
Given African American unemployment rates are consistently twice the rate of white workers in 2017, 
realizing true full employment continues to be vitally important today. As past economic conditions 
have illustrated, when labor markets tighten, workers begin to see broad-based wage gains and 
persistent economic inequalities are reduced. The Federal Reserve should continue to make monetary 
policy decisions that support equitable growth, prosperity, and job opportunities for all. As we 
approach the 40th anniversary of the landmark Humphrey-Hawkins Act, it is important for both the 
Federal Reserve and Congress to reaffirm the importance of the Federal Reserve’s full employment 
mandate and to take proactive steps to ensure it remains in place. Efforts by Federal Reserve officials 
or Congress to weaken or undermine the Fed’s full employment mandate would have adverse 
impacts on the economy, particularly for communities of color, and must be resisted.
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